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Abstract As a promising quantum key distribution (QKD), most of the ex-
isting round-robin differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution (RRDPS-
QKD) protocols have adopted the decoy-state method and have assumed the
source states are exactly controlled. However, the precise manipulation of
source states is impossible for any practical experiment, and the RRDPS-
QKD with source errors has an unignorable impact on the performance of the
protocol. In the paper, we study the three-intensity decoy-state RRDPS-QKD
protocol with source errors, formulate the secure generation key rate of the
proposed protocol, do the numerical simulations to testify the deductions. The
results show that our evaluation can estimate the influence of source errors.
Keywords Round-robin differential-phase-shift · Quantum key distribution ·
Decoy state · Source errors
PACS 03.67.Dd · 03.67.Hk
1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has developed rapidly due to its uncondi-
tional security [1,2,3]. Since the fist QKD (BB84-QKD) protocol was proposed
[4], many more secure and practical QKD protocols have been developed, such
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as decoy-state QKD (DS-QKD) [5,6,7,8], measurement-device-independent
QKD (MDI-QKD) [9,10].
In order to guarantee the security, most of these protocols need to mon-
itor the signal disturbance to estimate the amount of information leaked to
Eve [11,12]. However, the round-robin differential-phase-shift QKD (RRDPS-
QKD) [13], put forward by Sasaki et al. in 2014, can bound the information
leakage without monitoring the signal disturbance, but depending on the sig-
nal states prepared by the sender. Moreover, with a large enough train length,
the tolerance of bit error rate could be up to 50% in theory.
Hence, as a promising and practical protocol, lots of efforts have been made
to improve the performance and the practicality of the RRDPS-QKD [14,15,
16,17,18,19,20,21,22]. Yin et al. proposed an improved bound on informa-
tion leakage to enhance the practicality and performance of RRDPS-QKD
[17]. Zhang et al. applied the tagging technique to overcome the effects of
background noise and misalignment [15]. The heralded pair-coherent source
(HPCS) [19] and the heralded single photon source (HSPS) [18], respectively,
were adopted in the RRDPS-QKD protocol to improve the performance. We
presented a plug-and-play RRDPS-QKD protocol to make the RRDPS-QKD
scheme be more practical [22].
Owing to the usage of weak coherent photon source in practice, the decoy-
state method [5,6] has often been used in the most of existed RRDPS-QKD
protocols to guarantee the security of the protocols (avoiding the photon-
number-splitting attack), where the source states are always assumed to be
perfectly controlled in the photon-number space. However, it is impossible
for any real experimental setup to keep the source states be fully controlled,
because of the fluctuations of source power, the environmental interference
and other factors, etc.
On the other hand, the method to concern the source errors of decoy-
states has been demonstrated in BB84-QKD and MDI-QKD protocols [7,23,
24,25]. Wang et al. developed the general theory of decoy-state BB84-QKD
with source errors and studied the relationship between key generation rate
and source errors [7,23]. With the intensity fluctuations, the formula of secret
key generation rates for decoy-state BB84-QKD adopting the heralded single-
photon source (HSPS) was calculated in ref.[26], and the heralded pair coherent
source (HPCS) in ref.[27]. The studies on the decoy-state MDI-QKD method
with source errors were also presented in refs.[24,25]. However, up to now,
there has been no report on the decoy-state RRDPS-QKD method with source
errors yet.
In this paper, we study the effect of source errors in the RRDPS-QKD
protocol and show the details of how to formulate the secure generation key
rate by three-intensity decoy-state method. We deduce the lower bound of
count rate and the upper bound of bit error rate of the k-photon state for
the signal source only with one constraint of the source errors. Moreover, we
present the numerical simulations of according to our deductions.
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2 Three-intensity decoy-state RRDPS-QKD protocol with source
errors
2.1 The protocol
In the RRDPS-QKD protocol, Alice, the sender, prepares a train consisting of
L pulses, and encodes L random bits on the phases of L pulses in the train.
Then the encoded pulse-train is sent to Bob through a quantum channel. Upon
receiving the L-pulse train, Bob, the receiver, randomly picks two pulses in
a train, and measures the relative phase between them by an Mach-Zehnder
interferometer with a random delay. According to the publication of the suc-
cessful interfered pulse-indices (l, j), Alice can obtain her key bit according
to the pulse-indices. These steps are repeated until Alice and Bob accumulate
sufficient sifted key bits. After error correction and privacy amplification, Alice
and Bob can finally share a secure key.
In practical implementations, weak coherent source (WCS) [15], HSPS [18]
or HPCS [19] are often adopted to replace the ideal single-photon source, there-
after, the decoy state method is employed to enhance the performance of the
modified RRDPS-QKD protocol. Since the usage of infinite-intensity decoy-
states is impractical, three-intensity decoy-state method is demonstrated to
have the approaching performance [18,19] of the infinite-intensity decoy-state
method.
In the three-intensity decoy-state RRDPS-QKD protocol, Alice has four
source states, the signal state µ and three decoy states ν1, ν2 and ν3, and
their density matrix can be written as ρ =
∑J
k=0 pk,x |k〉 〈k| (x = µ, ν1, ν2, ν3).
Here, J is determined by the type of light source, and it can be either finite or
infinite. For WCS or HSPS, J is∞. The signal state is used to extract the final
key, while the decoy states are used to estimate the lower bound of the gain
and the upper bound of the bit error rate of the k-photon pulse-train. In the
whole protocol, we assume that M pulse-trains prepared by Alice is randomly
chosen from one of the four states with the probability Px for x = µ, ν1, ν2, ν3
and Pµ + Pν1 + Pν2 + Pν3 = 1.
Now, we consider the errors for the source states. At any time i (i ∈
{1, 2, ...,M}), each state is in the one slightly different from the expected,
and it is expressed by ρi =
∑J
k=0 pki,x |k〉 〈k|. Without loss of generality, the
minimum and maximum values of pki,x are assumed to be bounded by p
L
k,x
and pUk,x, respectively, i.e., p
L
k,x ≤ pki,x ≤ p
U
k,x, regardless of the error pattern.
In response to Alice, Bob observes the interference measurement for M
trains, and any successful interference result obtained from the ith pulse-train
is called as ”the ith train from Alice has caused a count” [23]. After completing
all the measurements, Alice and Bob check the source state for each count
by public discussion, and they obtain the number of count Nx (Nµ, Nν1 ,
Nν2 , Nν3) and count rate caused from each source state Qx(Qµ, Qν1 , Qν2 ,
Qν3), where Qµ = Nµ/(PµM), Qν1 = Nν1/(Pν1M), Qν2 = Nν2/(Pν2M) and
Qν3 = Nν3/(Pν3M).
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2.2 The secure key generation rate
The final key generation rate per pulse of the three-intensity decoy-state
RRDPS-QKD protocol can be calculated by [13,18,19]
R =
1
L
2∑
k=0
Qk,µ[1− fH2(e
k
b )−H2(e
k
ph)], (1)
where Qk,µ, e
k
b and e
k
ph represent to the count rate, the bit error rate and phase
error rate of the k-photon state for the signal state, respectively. f denotes the
efficiency of the error correction, and H2(x) = −x log2(x)− (1−x) log2(1−x)
is the information entropy function. According to the RRDPS-QKD protocol
[13], ekph is upper bounded by e
k
ph ≥ k/(L − 1), while Qk,µ and e
k
b need to be
estimated by adopting the decoy-state method, which exactly are our goals.
2.2.1 Lower bounds of Q0,µ, Q1,µ, Q2,µ
In order to estimate the low bound of Qk,µ, k ∈ {0, 1, 2} , we also use the
definition of set C and set ck in ref.[23].
Definition[23]. The set C contains any pulse-train that has caused a count,
and the set ck contains any k-photon pulse-train that has caused a count.
Mathematically, the necessary and sufficient condition for i ∈ C is that the
ith pulse-train has caused a count, and i ∈ ck is that the ith pulse-train
containing k photons has caused a count.
Accordingly, the overall counts of source state x can be given
Nx =
J∑
k=0
nk,x =
J∑
k=0
∑
i∈ck
Pxi|k =
∑
i∈c0
Pxi|0 +
∑
i∈c1
Pxi|1 +
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
Pxi|k, (2)
where nk,x denotes the number of counts caused by those pulse-trains con-
taining k photons from source state x (x = µ, ν1, ν2, ν3), and Pxi|k is the
probability of the ith pulse-train from the source state x on the premise of the
ith pulse-train containing k photons. Here, J can be either finite or infinite.
According to the protocol, Pxi|k is given by
Pxi|k =
Px · pki,x
Pµ · pki,µ + Pν1 · pki,ν1 + Pν2 · pki,ν2 + Pν3 · pki,ν3
. (3)
Let dki = 1/(Pµ · pki,µ + Pν1 · pki,ν1 + Pν2 · pki,ν2 + Pν3 · pki,ν3 ), we can have
Pxi|k = Px · pki,x · dki (4)
and
Nx =
J∑
k=0
nk,x =
J∑
k=0
∑
i∈ck
Px · pki,x · dki, (5)
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i.e.,
Nµ
Pµ
=
∑
i∈c0
p0i,µd0i +
∑
i∈c1
p1i,µd1i +
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
pki,µdki, (6)
Nν1
Pν1
=
∑
i∈c0
p0i,ν1d0i +
∑
i∈c1
p1i,ν1d1i +
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
pki,ν1dki, (7)
Nν2
Pν2
=
∑
i∈c0
p0i,ν2d0i +
∑
i∈c1
p1i,ν2d1i +
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
pki,ν2dki, (8)
Nν3
Pν3
=
∑
i∈c0
p0i,ν3d0i +
∑
i∈c1
p1i,ν3d1i +
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
pki,ν3dki. (9)
If the source errors exist, nk,µ, nk,ν1 , nk,ν2 and nk,ν3 should be bounded
by
pLk,µ
∑
i∈ck
dki ≤
nk,µ
Pµ
=
∑
i∈ck
pki,µdki ≤ p
U
k,µ
∑
i∈ck
dki, (10)
pLk,ν1
∑
i∈ck
dki ≤
nk,ν1
Pν1
=
∑
i∈ck
pki,ν1dki ≤ p
U
k,ν1
∑
i∈ck
dki, (11)
pLk,ν2
∑
i∈ck
dki ≤
nk,ν2
Pν2
=
∑
i∈ck
pki,ν2dki ≤ p
U
k,ν2
∑
i∈ck
dki, (12)
pLk,ν3
∑
i∈ck
dki ≤
nk,ν3
Pν3
=
∑
i∈ck
pki,ν3dki ≤ p
U
k,ν3
∑
i∈ck
dki. (13)
To minimize the values of Q0,µ, Q1,µ and Q2,µ, we need to minimize D0,D1 and
D2, which are defined as D0 =
∑
i∈ck
d0i, D1 =
∑
i∈ck
d1i, D2 =
∑
i∈ck
d2i.
Using Eqs.(6)-(9), the lower bound of D0, D1, D2 can be estimated as the
following. (see the details in the Appendix)
DL0 = max


pL1,ν1
Nν2
Pν2
− pU1,ν2
Nν1
Pν1
pL1,ν1p
U
0,ν2
− pU1,ν2p
L
0,ν1
, 0

 ,
DL1 =
(pL0,ν2
Nν1
Pν1
− pU0,ν1
Nν2
Pν2
)pL2,µ − q1(
Nµ
Pµ
− pL0,µD
L
0 )
q3pL2,µ − q1p
L
1,µ
,
DL2 =
{[
(pL0,ν2
Nν1
Pν1
− pU0,ν1
Nν2
Pν2
)q2 − (p
U
0,ν3
Nν2
Pν2
− pL0,ν2
Nν3
Pν3
)q3
]
pL3,µ
−(s1q2 − s2q3)(
Nµ
Pµ
− pL0,µD
L
0 − p
L
1,µD
L
1 )
}
/{[
q1q2 − (p
U
0,ν3p
L
2,ν2 − p
L
0,ν2p
U
2,ν3)q3
]
pL3,µ − (s1q2 − s2q3)p
L
2,µ
}
,(14)
where q1 = p
L
0,ν2p
U
2,ν1 − p
U
0,ν1p
L
2,ν2 , q2 = p
U
0,ν3p
L
1,ν2 − p
L
0,ν2p
U
1,ν3 , q3 = p
L
0,ν2p
U
1,ν1 −
pU0,ν1p
L
1,ν2 , s1 = p
L
0,ν2p
U
3,ν1 − p
U
0,ν1p
L
3,ν2 , s2 = p
U
0,ν3p
L
3,ν2 − p
L
0,ν2p
U
3,ν3 . Therefore,
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according to the definition of QLk,µ = nk,µ/(PµM) = p
L
k,µD
L
k /M , the lower
bounds of Q0,µ, Q1,µ and Q2,µ are given by
QL0,µ =max
{
pL
0,µ(p
L
1,ν1
Qν2 − p
U
1,ν2
Qν1)
pL
1,ν1
pU
0,ν2
− pU
1,ν2
pL
0,ν1
, 0
}
, (15)
QL1,µ =
pL
1,µ
[
(pL
0,ν2
Qν1 − p
U
0,ν1
Qν2)p
L
2,µ − q1(Qµ −Q
L
0,µ)
]
q3pL2,µ − q1p
L
1,µ
,
QL2,µ =
pL
2,µ
{[
(pL
0,ν2
Qν1 − p
U
0,ν1
Qν2)q2 − (p
U
0,ν3
Qν2 − p
L
0,ν2
Qν3)q3
]
pL
3,µ − (s1q2 − s2q3)(Qµ −Q
L
0,µ −Q
L
1,µ)
}
{[
q1q2 − (pU0,ν3p
L
2,ν2
− pL
0,ν2
pU
2,ν3
)q3
]
pL
3,µ − (s1q2 − s2q3)p
L
2,µ
} .
2.2.2 Upper bounds of e1, e2
Here ek is the abbreviation of e
k
b . Define Ex as the overall quantum bit error
rate (QBER) of source x, which is given by
NxEx =
J∑
k=0
nk,xek =
J∑
k=0
∑
i∈ck
Px · pki,x · dki · ek. (16)
i.e.,
NµEµ = Pµ[
∑
i∈c0
p0i,µd0ie0 +
∑
i∈c1
p1i,µd1ie1 +
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
pki,µdkiek], (17)
Nν1Eν1 = Pν1 [
∑
i∈c0
p0i,ν1d0ie0 +
∑
i∈c1
p1i,ν1d1ie1 +
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
pki,ν1dkiek], (18)
Nν2Eν2 = Pν2 [
∑
i∈c0
p0i,ν2d0ie0 +
∑
i∈c1
p1i,ν2d1ie1 +
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
pki,ν2dkiek], (19)
Nν3Eν3 = Pν3 [
∑
i∈c0
p0i,ν3d0ie0 +
∑
i∈c1
p1i,ν3d1ie1 +
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
pki,ν3dkiek]. (20)
Then the upper bounds of e1, e2 can be estimated as (see the details in the
Appendix)
eU1 =
(pU0,ν2Qν1Eν1 − p
L
0,ν1Qν2Eν2)p
L
1,µ
(pU0,ν2p
L
1,ν1
− pL0,ν1p
U
1,ν2
)QL1,µ
, (21)
eU2 =
pL2,µ
[
(pU0,ν2Qν1Eν1 − p
L
0,ν1Qν2Eν2)q4 − (p
L
0,ν3Qν2Eν2 − p
U
0,ν2Qν3Eν3)q5
]
[
(pU0,ν2p
L
2,ν1
− pL0,ν1p
U
2,ν2
)q4 − (pL0,ν3p
U
2,ν2
− pU0,ν2p
L
2,ν3
)q5
]
QL2,µ
,
where q4 = p
L
0,ν3p
U
1,ν2 − p
U
0,ν2p
L
1,ν3 , q5 = p
U
0,ν2p
L
1,ν1 − p
L
0,ν1p
U
1,ν2 .
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3 Numerical simulations
Utilizing all the above deduction, we can conclude the secure key generation
rate of the proposed QKD protocol. Here, we use WCS source as an example,
we calculate and present the secure key rate performance of the proposed QKD
protocol.
For WCS source with intensity x per pulse-train, it follows a Poisson dis-
tribution, and the k-photon probability could be given by pk,x = e
−xxk/k!.
Considering the actual three-intensity decoy-state RRDPS-QKD protocol at
any train i, the intensity of the source x is xi = x(1 + δxi) (x = µ, ν1, ν2
and ν3), and the four intensities must satisfy ν1i ≥ ν2i ≥ ν3i ≥ 0 and
(ν1i + ν2i + ν3i) < µi < 1, where the upper bound of |δxi | ≤ δx. For sim-
plicity, we assume all the signal source state and the three decoy source states
have the same upper bound δ, i.e., δ = δµ = δν1 = δν2 = δν3 . Hence, pki,x is
bounded by [pLk,x, p
U
k,x], and
pL0,x = p0,x(1+δ), p
U
0,x = p0,x(1−δ),
pLk,x = pk,x(1−δ), p
U
k,x = pk,x(1+δ), (22)
for all k ≥ 1.
In addition, the overall count rate Qx (Qµ, Qν1 , Qν2 , Qν3) and the over-
all QBER (Eµ, Eν1 , Eν2 , Eν3), which can be directly measured in practical
experiments, here, are given by
Qµ = 1− (1 − pd)e
−µηtηB ,
Qν1 = 1− (1 − pd)e
−ν1ηtηB ,
Qν2 = 1− (1 − pd)e
−ν2ηtηB ,
Qν3 = 1− (1 − pd)e
−ν3ηtηB , (23)
and
Eµ = [ed(1− pd)(1− e
−µηtηB ) + e0pd]/Qµ,
Eν1 = [ed(1− pd)(1− e
−ν1ηtηB ) + e0pd]/Qν1 ,
Eν2 = [ed(1− pd)(1− e
−ν2ηtηB ) + e0pd]/Qν2 ,
Eν3 = [ed(1− pd)(1− e
−ν3ηtηB ) + e0pd]/Qν3 , (24)
where e0 and ed are the error probabilities caused by the background and
the misalignment, respectively. pd denotes the background count rate for the
detector, and ηB is the efficiency of Bob’s detectors. ηt is the efficiency of the
channel transmission, which is expressed as ηt = 10
−αz/10, where α and z are
the channel transmission loss rate and the transmission distance, respectively.
In our numerical simulations, the corresponding parameters are listed in
Tab.1 [28], where L represents the pulse train length. Furthermore, the values
of µ, ν1, ν2 and ν3 are optimized to obtain the optimal key rate performance.
Fig.1 shows the performance of the RRDPS-QKD protocol with source
errors and without source errors for L = 8, L = 12, L = 16 and L = 20.
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Table 1 Parameters for our simulations
Pd ed e0 ηB α f
1.7× 10−6L 3.3% 50% 4.5% 0.2dB/km 1.16
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Fig. 1 Key rate comparison for the RRDPS-QKD with and without source errors.
Here, parameter δ of the source errors is set as 0.05. The result shows that,
for the protocol with source errors, the key rates decrease with the increasing
transmission distance, and the performance for L = 16 is best. Moreover,
from the comparison between the protocol with and without source errors,
it is found that the performance of the protocol with source errors is always
worse than the case without source errors.
The influence of source errors on the key rate is presented in Fig.2 and
Fig.3, where L is set to 16.
Fig.2 shows the key rate ratios (R(δ)/R(0)) versus transmission distance
for δ = 0.02, 0.05 and 0.08, where R(δ) is the key rate with source errors and
R(0) is the key rate without source errors. From Fig.2, it can be seen that δ
has an effect on the key rate, especially over a large distance. Moreover, the
larger δ is, the smaller the value of R(δ)/R(0) is, i.e., the greater the impact
on key rate is.
Fig.3 depicts the key rate ratios (R(δ)/R(0)) against δ for transmission
distance z = 15km, 30km and 60km. The results indicate that the influence
on the key rates increases with the increasing δ for any certain transmission
distance. Comparing with the key rate ratios over three transmission distances,
it is found that the larger transmission distance is, the smaller the ratio on
key rate is, which means the greater influence.
RRDPS-QKD with source errors 9
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
10−2
10−1
100
distance (km)
ke
y 
ra
te
 ra
tio
 (R
(δ)
/R
(0)
 
 
δ=0.02
δ=0.05
δ=0.08
Fig. 2 Key rate ratio versus transmission distance for different δ.
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Fig. 3 Key rate ratio against δ for different transmission distance z.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the influence of source errors on the secure
key generation rate of the RRDPS-QKD protocol with three-intensity decoy-
states. We have presented tight bounds of the key generation rate when the
count rate and the bit error rate of k-photon states for the signal state are
bounded. WCS has been used as the example to discuss the performance of
the three-intensity decoy-state RRDPS-QKD protocol with source errors. The
results have shown that the practical RRDPS-QKD with source errors has an
unignorable impact on the secure key generation rate. The larger source error
is, the higher degradation of secure key rate is. Simultaneously, the longer
transmission distance is, the greater secure key rate degrades. By extending
our formulas to any type of source, such as HSPS and HPCS, the influence on
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the performance of practical RRDPS-QKD protocol with source errors can be
estimated.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Lower bounds of D0,D1,D2
In order to get the lower bound of D0, applying p
L
1,ν1Eq.(8)− p
U
1,ν2Eq.(7), we
have
pL1,ν1
Nν2
Pν2
− pU1,ν2
Nν1
Pν1
=
∑
i∈c0
(
pL1,ν1p0i,ν2 − p
U
1,ν2
p0i,ν1
)
d0i +
∑
i∈c1
(
pL1,ν1p1i,ν2 − p
U
1,ν2
p1i,ν1
)
d1i
+
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
(
pL1,ν1pki,ν2 − p
U
1,ν2
pki,ν1
)
dki
≤
∑
i∈c0
(
pL1,ν1p
U
0,ν2
− pU1,ν2p
L
0,ν1
)
d0i +
∑
i∈c1
(
pL1,ν1p
U
1,ν2
− pU1,ν2p
L
1,ν1
)
d1i
+
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
(
pL1,ν1p
U
k,ν2
− pU1,ν2p
L
k,ν1
)
dki
=
(
pL1,ν1p
U
0,ν2
− pU1,ν2p
L
0,ν1
) ∑
i∈c0
d0i +
(
pL1,ν1p
U
k,ν2
− pU1,ν2p
L
k,ν1
) J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
dki. (25)
According to the definitions of D0, D1 and D2, we get
pL1,ν1
Nν2
Pν2
− pU1,ν2
Nν1
Pν1
≤
(
pL1,ν1p
U
0,ν2 − p
U
1,ν2p
L
0,ν1
)
D0 +
J∑
k=2
(
pL1,ν1p
U
k,ν2 − p
U
1,ν2p
L
k,ν1
)
Dk. (26)
Due to the relation of the source intensities chosen in decoy-state method,
there is an important condition
pLk,ν1
pU
k,ν2
≥
pL
2,ν1
pU
2,ν2
≥
pL
1,ν1
pU
1,ν2
for all k ≥ 2, which
has been demonstrated in refs.[23,26,27], and we can obtain an inequality
pL1,ν1p
U
k,ν2
− pU1,ν2p
L
k,ν1
≤ 0 for all k ≥ 2. Therefore, the inequality in Eq.(26)
becomes
pL1,ν1
Nν2
Pν2
− pU1,ν2
Nν1
Pν1
≤
(
pL1,ν1p
U
0,ν2 − p
U
1,ν2p
L
0,ν1
)
D0, (27)
and the lower bound of D0 is obtained by
D0 ≥ D
L
0 = max


pL1,ν1
Nν2
Pν2
− pU1,ν2
Nν1
Pν1
pL1,ν1p
U
0,ν2
− pU1,ν2p
L
0,ν1
, 0

 . (28)
RRDPS-QKD with source errors 11
Then, similar to Eq.(25), by pL0,ν2Eq.(7)− p
U
0,ν1Eq.(8), we have
pL0,ν2
Nν1
Pν1
− pU0,ν1
Nν2
Pν2
≤ (pL0,ν2p
U
1,ν1
− pU0,ν1p
L
1,ν2
)D1 +
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
(pL0,ν2p
U
k,ν1
− pU0,ν1p
L
k,ν2
)dki
≤ (pL0,ν2p
U
1,ν1
− pU0,ν1p
L
1,ν2
)D1 +
pL
0,ν2
pU
k,ν1
− pU
0,ν1
pL
k,ν2
pL
k,µ
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
dkipk,µ
≤ (pL0,ν2p
U
1,ν1
− pU0,ν1p
L
1,ν2
)D1 +
pL
0,ν2
pU
2,ν1
− pU
0,ν1
pL
2,ν2
pL
2,µ
[
Nµ
Pµ
− pL0,µD
L
0 − p
L
1,µD1].(29)
Here, the inequality that
(pL
0,ν2
pUk,ν1−p
U
0,ν1
pLk,ν2)
pL
k,µ
≤
(pL
0,ν2
pU
2,ν1
−pU
0,ν1
pL
2,ν2
)
pL
2,µ
for k ≥ 2
is adopted to prove the inequality in Eq.(29). Consequently, the lower bound
of D1 can be estimated by
D1 ≥ D
L
1 =
(pL
0,ν2
Nν1
Pν1
− pU
0,ν1
Nν2
Pν2
)pL
2,µ − (p
L
0,ν2
pU
2,ν1
− pU
0,ν1
pL
2,ν2
)(
Nµ
Pµ
− pL
0,µD
L
0
)
(pL
0,ν2
pU
1,ν1
− pU
0,ν1
pL
1,ν2
)pL
2,µ − (p
L
0,ν2
pU
2,ν1
− pU
0,ν1
pL
2,ν2
)pL
1,µ
, (30)
where DL0 has been calculated in Eq.(28).
Combining the two equations (pL0,ν2Eq.(7)−p
U
0,ν1Eq.(8)) and (p
U
0,ν3Eq.(8)−
pL0,ν2Eq.(9)), we can have
(pL0,ν2
Nν1
Pν1
− pU0,ν1
Nν2
Pν2
)(pU0,ν3p
L
1,ν2
− pL0,ν2p
U
1,ν3
)− (pU0,ν3
Nν2
Pν2
− pL0,ν2
Nν3
Pν3
)(pL0,ν2p
U
1,ν1
− pU0,ν1p
L
1,ν2
)
≤ [(pL0,ν2p
U
2,ν1
− pU0,ν1p
L
2,ν2
)(pU0,ν3p
L
1,ν2
− pL0,ν2p
U
1,ν3
)− (pU0,ν3p
L
2,ν2
− pL0,ν2p
U
2,ν3
)(pL0,ν2p
U
1,ν1
− pU0,ν1p
L
1,ν2
)]D2
+
(pL
0,ν2
pU
k,ν1
− pU
0,ν1
pL
k,ν2
)(pU
0,ν3
pL
1,ν2
− pL
0,ν2
pU
1,ν3
)− (pU
0,ν3
pL
k,ν2
− pL
0,ν2
pU
k,ν3
)(pL
0,ν2
pU
1,ν1
− pU
0,ν1
pL
1,ν2
)
pL
k,µ
J∑
k=3
∑
i∈ck
pki,µdki
≤ [(pL0,ν2p
U
2,ν1
− pU0,ν1p
L
2,ν2
)(pU0,ν3p
L
1,ν2
− pL0,ν2p
U
1,ν3
)− (pU0,ν3p
L
2,ν2
− pL0,ν2p
U
2,ν3
)(pL0,ν2p
U
1,ν1
− pU0,ν1p
L
1,ν2
)]D2
+
(pL
0,ν2
pU
3,ν1
− pU
0,ν1
pL
3,ν2
)(pU
0,ν3
pL
1,ν2
− pL
0,ν2
pU
1,ν3
) − (pU
0,ν3
pL
3,ν2
− pL
0,ν2
pU
3,ν3
)(pL
0,ν2
pU
1,ν1
− pU
0,ν1
pL
1,ν2
)
pL
3,µ
·(
Nµ
Pµ
− pL0,µD
L
0 − p
L
1,µD
L
1 − p
L
2,µD2), (31)
Hence, the lower bound of D2 can be expressed by
D2 ≥ D
L
2
=
{[
(pL0,ν2
Nν1
Pν1
− pU0,ν1
Nν2
Pν2
)(pU0,ν3p
L
1,ν2
− pL0,ν2p
U
1,ν3
)− (pU0,ν3
Nν2
Pν2
− pL0,ν2
Nν3
Pν3
)(pL0,ν2p
U
1,ν1
− pU0,ν1p
L
1,ν2
)
]
pL3,µ
−
[
(pL0,ν2p
U
3,ν1
− pU0,ν1p
L
3,ν2
)(pU0,ν3p
L
1,ν2
− pL0,ν2p
U
1,ν3
)− (pU0,ν3p
L
3,ν2
− pL0,ν2p
U
3,ν3
)(pL0,ν2p
U
1,ν1
− pU0,ν1p
L
1,ν2
)
]
(
Nµ
Pµ
− pL0,µD
L
0 − p
L
1,µD
L
1 )
}/{[
(pL0,ν2p
U
2,ν1
− pU0,ν1p
L
2,ν2
)(pU0,ν3p
L
1,ν2
− pL0,ν2p
U
1,ν3
)
−(pU0,ν3p
L
2,ν2
− pL0,ν2p
U
2,ν3
)(pL0,ν2p
U
1,ν1
− pU0,ν1p
L
1,ν2
)
]
pL3,µ −
[
(pL0,ν2p
U
3,ν1
− pU0,ν1p
L
3,ν2
)(pU0,ν3p
L
1,ν2
− pL0,ν2p
U
1,ν3
)
−(pU0,ν3p
L
3,ν2
− pL0,ν2p
U
3,ν3
)(pL0,ν2p
U
1,ν1
− pU0,ν1p
L
1,ν2
)
]
pL2,µ
}
. (32)
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5.2 Upper bounds of e1, e2
According to pU0,ν2
Eq. (18)
Pν1
− pL0,ν1
Eq. (19)
Pν2
, we have
pU0,ν2
Nν1
Pν1
Eν1 − p
L
0,ν1
Nν2
Pν2
Eν2 =
∑
i∈c0
(pU0,ν2p0i,ν1 − p
L
0,ν1p0i,ν2)d0ie0
+
∑
i∈c1
(pU0,ν2p1i,ν1 − p
L
0,ν1p1i,ν2)d1ie1 +
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
(pU0,ν2pki,ν1 − p
L
0,ν1pki,ν2 )dkiek
≥ (pU0,ν2p
L
1,ν1 − p
L
0,ν1p
U
1,ν2)D1e1 +
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
(pU0,ν2p
L
k,ν1 − p
L
0,ν1p
U
k,ν2)dkiek
≥ (pU0,ν2p
L
1,ν1 − p
L
0,ν1p
U
1,ν2)D1e1, (33)
where the inequality pU0,ν2p
L
k,ν1
− pL0,ν1p
U
k,ν2
≥ 0 is used. Then the upper bound
of e1 is given by
e1 ≤ e
U
1 =
pU0,ν2
Nν1
Pν1
Eν1 − p
L
0,ν1
Nν2
Pν2
Eν2
(pU0,ν2p
L
1,ν1
− pL0,ν1p
U
1,ν2
)DL1
=
(pU0,ν2
Nν1
Pν1
Eν1 − p
L
0,ν1
Nν2
Pν2
Eν2)p
L
1,µ
(pU0,ν2p
L
1,ν1
− pL0,ν1p
U
1,ν2
)DL1 p
L
1,µ
=
(pU0,ν2Qν1Eν1 − p
L
0,ν1Qν2Eν2 )p
L
1,µ
(pU0,ν2p
L
1,ν1
− pL0,ν1p
U
1,ν2
)QL1,µ
. (34)
Finally, the upper bound of e2 can be deduced by combing (p
U
0,ν2
Eq. (18)
Pν1
−
pL0,ν1
Eq. (19)
Pν2
) and (pL0,ν3
Eq. (19)
Pν2
− pU0,ν2
Eq. (20)
Pν3
). i.e.,
(pU0,ν2
Nν1
Pν1
Eν1 − p
L
0,ν1
Nν2
Pν2
Eν2 )(p
L
0,ν3
pU1,ν2 − p
U
0,ν2
pL1,ν3)− (p
L
0,ν3
Nν2
Pν2
Eν2 − p
U
0,ν2
Nν3
Pν3
Eν3)(p
U
0,ν2
pL1,ν1 − p
L
0,ν1
pU1,ν2 )
≥ [(pU0,ν2p
L
2,ν1
− pL0,ν1p
U
2,ν2
)(pL0,ν3p
U
1,ν2
− pU0,ν2p
L
1,ν3
)− (pL0,ν3p
U
2,ν2
− pU0,ν2p
L
2,ν3
)(pU0,ν2p
L
1,ν1
− pL0,ν1p
U
1,ν2
)]D2e2
+
J∑
k=3
∑
i∈ck
[(pU0,ν2p
L
k,ν1
− pL0,ν1p
U
k,ν2
)(pL0,ν3p
U
1,ν2
− pU0,ν2p
L
1,ν3
) − (pL0,ν3p
U
k,ν2
− pU0,ν2p
L
k,ν3
)(pU0,ν2p
L
1,ν1
− pL0,ν1p
U
1,ν2
)]dkiek
≥ [(pU0,ν2p
L
2,ν1
− pL0,ν1p
U
2,ν2
)(pL0,ν3p
U
1,ν2
− pU0,ν2p
L
1,ν3
)− (pL0,ν3p
U
2,ν2
− pU0,ν2p
L
2,ν3
)(pU0,ν2p
L
1,ν1
− pL0,ν1p
U
1,ν2
)]D2e2, (35)
hence, the e2 is bounded by
e2 ≤ e
U
2 = p
L
2,µ
[
(pU0,ν2Qν1Eν1 − p
L
0,ν1Qν2Eν2)(p
L
0,ν3p
U
1,ν2 − p
U
0,ν2p
L
1,ν3)
− (pL0,ν3Qν2Eν2 − p
U
0,ν2Qν3Eν3)(p
U
0,ν2p
L
1,ν1 − p
L
0,ν1p
U
1,ν2)
]/{[
(pL0,ν3p
U
1,ν2 − p
U
0,ν2p
L
1,ν3)
(pU0,ν2p
L
2,ν1 − p
L
0,ν1p
U
2,ν2)− (p
U
0,ν2p
L
1,ν1 − p
L
0,ν1p
U
1,ν2)(p
L
0,ν3p
U
2,ν2 − p
U
0,ν2p
L
2,ν3)
]
QL2,µ
}
(36)
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